Volume XXXVIII, Issue 1
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February 23, 2007
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Friendly Fire: The Iraq Troop Level Surge


Should the US increase its troop commitment in Iraq through a Surge?

 

Starting with this issue, the pages of the Review will play host to “Friendly Fire”. Two writers will debate a pressing issue of the day, taking opposite sides. Each will know the other’s basic argument and will address it head on. This will make for more contentious and fruitful debate. While the fire on these pages may get heated at times, it will always remain friendly: by spurring direct debate, we hope to raise the general level of discourse and a mutual understanding of salient issues.

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For the Surge

Our nation, Democrats and Republicans, Bush supporters and opponents, liberals, conservatives and libertarians alike, is engaged in a global War on Terror that was viciously inaugurated on 9/11. Our enemies kill Americans indiscriminately and, thus, we will all shoulder the consequences of American policy abroad, including in Iraq. We therefore have a responsibility as citizens in a democracy to acknowledge that, regardless of our opinions on the war, we ought to pursue that strategy most capable of securing victory.

Unlike in Vietnam, where in Saigon in 1975 we abandoned thousands to a violent death but largely escaped any retribution from our enemies, the War for Iraq will have reverberations in the most volatile region of the world. Defeat in Iraq, which is not inevitable, would wreak inevitable damage on US interests at home and abroad. While the planned surge may not guarantee success in Iraq, it is a sound strategy fundamentally grounded in counterinsurgency theory. The plans of the President’s critics, on the other hand, are both largely incoherent and, where they prescribe withdrawal, are noted by the most recent National Intelligence Report to have a high chance of increasing violence in Iraq should they be implemented.

The major provisions of the President’s plan include both a visible troop increase, by approximately 21,000 combat units, and a dramatic new design of US-Iraqi troop interaction. The call for more troops is not, however, unfamiliar: once a darling of the left, Gen. Shinseki is famous for having drawn significant attention prior to the war to what he regarded as inadequate troop levels—an assessment pooh-poohed by the administration, but later vindicated by events on the ground.

Additional criticisms point to the fact that the US has already attempted a temporary surge to protect Baghdad, Operation Together Forward (OTF), and that the failures of this campaign serve as foreshadowing for this effort. These criticism fall short because OTF featured a relatively small surge of about 7,000 troops, and the President’s plan today includes dramatic shifts in tactics and operational structure. For example, Prime Minister Maliki has created a new Iraqi command for the city of Baghdad, and President Bush has injected the top American command with fresh leadership—including the notable mind and leadership of Princeton educated (Ph.D.) Gen. David Petraeus, whose expertise in counterinsurgency has already won him tremendous kudos for successful command in Tal Afar. Additionally, tactical improvements such as embedding troops with Iraqi units and an increased focus on training will finally allow troops to execute the “hold” phase the government’s “Clear, Hold, Build” strategy.

There is a popular consensus among the President’s critics that there must be a ‘political’ solution in Iraq first, before we can attempt to secure a physical or military solution. However, to expect that political compromise can be reached without a precondition of security is simply unrealistic. Imagine you are the Sunni victim of a brutal Shia death squad attack, having recently suffered the loss of your brother and husband. How will you approach “negotiations” between the sects? In contrast, the assumption of the President’s plan is that such political negotiations can only occur when the average Baghdadi can live a relatively normal life. As the situation is now, and as it is guaranteed to continue as under a no-surge policy, the average citizen’s first concern is security, at any cost. True, a political solution will ultimately be necessary for the long-term success of an independent Iraq, but it is not a magic cure-all that can be sought, and certainly not expected, without security provisions.

The road ahead in Iraq will be difficult and costly. However, the President’s plan offers both hope of victory and a commitment of support to the true victims of this conflict—the Iraqi people themselves.

Against the Surge

America is at a crucial juncture in the war in Iraq. The situation on the ground has deteriorated to the point where America must make a decision: whether to become deeply involved in a full scale ethnic civil war, or begin a phased withdrawal, allowing Iraq to gradually take responsibility for its own people. Clearly the latter option is in the best interest of both America and Iraq.

A “surge” of American troops will only lead to an increase in insurgency activity and more bloodshed for both coalition troops and the Iraqi people. A surge will only intensify the ethnic civil war between Sunnis and the Shiites. A surge will only breed more resentment toward America in the global community. And surge will not solve the true sources of conflict.

Let’s first take a look at the situation in Iraq. An estimated 62,000 Iraqi citizens have been killed and 3,133 American troops have died. What progress has been made to justify these deaths? Three divisive elections have been held. One dictator has been ritualistically hung. And one full-scale ethnic conflict has erupted. Moreover, nothing has been accomplished to help the so-called “War on Terror.” If anything, our excursion into the Middle East has hurt the War on Terror by intensifying resentment against the US in the Middle East. Our time in Iraq thus far has done nothing to further the causes of freedom and democracy in the Middle East.
A surge in American troops will not solve Iraq’s deepest problems. It may temporarily halt the car bombs, halt the ethnic murders, and halt the market bombs. And, of course, these would be positive developments. But a troop surge will ultimately not address why there are car-bombs, why there are murders, or why there are market bombs. Military progress does not necessarily lead to political progress, and therefore a more secure Iraq will not necessarily mean a prosperous and free Iraq.

Only when Iraq has resolved its political tensions will there be a chance for durable security. Since 2003, Bush’s tactics in Iraq have continually fractured Iraq’s diverse communities. A surge, as outlined by Fareed Zakaria, will increase ethnic tension. The disassembling of Sunni militias by the coalition will make them feel more vulnerable. Shiite militias will, in the meantime, integrate their militias into the Iraqi armed services and government. Shiites will become politically dominant, and Sunnis will not support the national Iraqi government.

But a political solution can circumvent this course. It must be worked at, haggled over, and debated, but with an open dialogue between Shiites, Sunnis, America, Iran, and every other major player, differences will be overcome. Solutions will be reached, situations will be stabilized, and actual security will come to Iraq.

Finally, much has been said about the analogy between the Vietnam War and the current conflict in Iraq. In Vietnam, the United States eventually pulled out. Then, just decades later, Presidents have visited and markets have opened. The stable Vietnam we fought for did eventually arrive- but long after our troops were gone.




 

 

 

 

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