Dealing with Iran: The Battle Against Nuclear Proliferation
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The recent conformation that North Korea tested a low-yield nuclear weapon brings new urgency to the West’s confrontation of nuclear proliferating renegade states. Iran continues to enrich uranium, and has admitted doing so, in strict defiance of the rest of the world. Eventually this impasse will break down and change the status quo.
The West’s response can take one of three forms: 1) a passive appeasement that allows Iran to do what it wishes 2) an aggressive response through military intervention, or 3) continued negotiations. The Stanford Review has discussed the implications of these options with Abbas Milani, Director of the Iranian Studies Program at Stanford and resident of Iran until 1986.
Passive Response
A passive response would entail acquiesce on the part of the West with regard to Iran’s nuclear development program, and possible future weapons program. To Milani, this is among the worst options the West could pursue. It would “strengthen the hands of the regime in general and Ahmadinejad in particular.” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the President of Iran, but that position is not the most powerful. That distinction belongs to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. However, Ahmadinejad has been using the nuclear issue to gain power and if the West were to let him have his nuclear program, it would be a huge political victory for Ahmadinejad.
While few, if any, in the Bush administration would advocate appeasement of Iran, the U.S. has used this type of response to Pakistan and India when they developed their nuclear weapons. The logic behind that action was in the understanding that India and Pakistan sought to create balance in the region in the face of a threat from nuclear-armed China; thus, the target of that development was not the U.S. or one of its close allies.
Military Response
Any military action could include an air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel conducted a raid of this sort in 1981 against an Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osirak, Iraq. The reactor was destroyed, but in that raid, all the nuclear facilities were centralized in one compound. Another option of military intervention could include a full-scale invasion, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In a speech at the Hillel House, Professor Larry Diamond noted that, given the disbursement of nuclear facilities in Iran, any bombing campaign would need to be so massive that collateral damage would include Iran’s infrastructure, and many historical and cultural sites, whose proximity to nuclear facilities is no mere accident. This destruction, combined with the popular solidarity in response to an attack by Western powers, would serve to consolidate the regime’s power. Milani described any attack as a “godsend” for Ahmadinejad, who would then use the attack to further disassemble any democratic element remaining in Iranian society. Currently, Ahmadinejad portrays the status quo as a conflict between the West and Islam. Any attack, Milani believes, would only enforce that statement in the eyes of the Iranian people. Milani argues that any invasion of Iran would be far worse than Iraq is now. Iran has an army three times the size of Iraq’s army, and Iran’s economy is stronger than Iraq’s was at the time of the invasion. Iraq had been weakened by ten years of embargo as well as British and American patrols in the no-fly zones over most of Iraq.
Negotiations
The most logical way to handle the Iranian conflict is through negotiation. Milani believes that Iran is not likely to fully abide to an agreement and will most likely break the rules when given the opportunity. But this does not make negotiation futile. The most significant product of the negotiations will be to allow the natural democratization of Iran to unfold. Milani used the metaphor of two ticking clocks. One clock is counting down until Iran’s atomic bomb is operational. The other clock is the inevitable democratization of Iran. Whichever clock reaches zero first, for lack of a better term, achieves victory, whether it is Ahmadinejad or the democratic movement. The goal of the West cannot be to stop the atomic clock and there are limitations on the ability of the West to speed up the democratization clock without destabilizing it. Instead, Milani argues, the West must try to slow down the atomic clock and “help the indigenous democratic movement in Iran” without forcing democracy on Iran.
The good news, Milani suggested, is that there is a democratic movement in Iran, and it is more powerful than the media portrays it to be. The regime in Tehran has an 80% unpopularity rating. And while most Iranians say that Iran should have a nuclear program, they also say that they would not want a nuclear program if it would extend the life of the current regime. This hatred of the regime will be the biggest help to the West in a standoff over nuclear weapons. To harness that, the West must not just deal with the government of Iran, but with the people of Iran, because eventually they will be in power.
In the negotiations, the West must be willing to give Iran considerable economic aid, because Iran is in terrible need of stimulation (the unemployment is between 18 and 25%) and because opening Iran to the world is a first step to democratization. The U.S. has long held out on letting Iran into the World Trade Organization (WTO), but if it is offered to Iran in return for some ground on the nuclear issue, there is a good chance they would accept it. Iran has wanted to be in the WTO since 1996, and while it is an observer, it does not have membership. This will help to delay the development of the bomb, but more importantly, it will bolster the democracy movement in Iran.
To those who oppose negotiations with Iran on the principle that the United States cannot trust any agreement, Milani points out that the U.S. has always negotiated with its enemies. For example, the U.S. had a policy of negotiating with the Soviet Union throughout most of the Cold War. President Nixon opened up a dialogue with China in the 1970s. As for trusting the regime, President Reagan once reasoned, “Trust but verify.”
