Understanding Iraq
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In my last article I sought to provide a brief summary of the significant errors committed by our national leadership in the War for Iraq. These mistakes have in part created a conflict which can only be described optimistically as “two steps forward, one step back.” However, much of the difficulty in prosecuting this war arises from incorrect perceptions and faulty comparisons. The War for Iraq is, simply put, unique. It is not World War II, it is not Vietnam, and it is certainly not—as many in the administration seemed to believe—Gulf War II.
In Iraq, the US military has engaged in three phases of conflict. The first, conventional war, is the most familiar and concluded with the fall of Saddam and the dismantling of his Ba’ath party structure. Following the summer of 2003, however, the Iraqi peoples’ disillusionment with a sluggish reconstruction fueled a growing insurgency comprised mostly of Ba’athist loyalists and Al-Qaeda operatives. This effort—crucial to the establishment of a legitimate government in Iraq—is better explained by models of counterinsurgency than oft-quoted rhetoric evoking WWII liberation or the Cold War’s intractable ideologies. Furthermore, success in this fight will go a long way towards preventing a third and likely more grim phase of fighting—full civil war.
In assessing Iraq as a counterinsurgency, we must first confront the bogeyman of time. We Americans don’t like long wars—they’re costly, painful, complicated, and boring (even our own Civil War lasted only four years). Unfortunate for us, however, modern conflicts are increasingly described in exactly those terms, and insurgencies are particularly suited for the long fight. For example, Mao’s rebellion lasted 20 years, Ho Chi Minh fought for 30, and the FARC guerillas of Colombia have now surpassed the four decade mark.
This trend in long fights is due to the sweeping goals of an insurgency—often rooted in social and political revolution—and the dedication of their followers. It also results from the difficulty on the part of the counterinsurgent to quash such rebellions. Ultimately, the title of “victor” in an insurgency is not claimed necessarily by the strongest, largest, or most ethical party, but rather by that group possessing the most durable will.
Counterinsurgents are at a natural disadvantage in these fights. To win, they must provide security, good governance, and social services with few exceptions. The insurgent, however, thrives in chaos and subsequently encourages it by chosen tactics and targets. A successful insurgent group recognizes that instability creates evidence to convince the population of the failures of government, as well as opportunities for ascendancy. It is, as all wars, primarily a contest of political will.
And the most valuable weapon of war in such a fight are the people themselves. Mao famously describes the population as ‘water’ for the insurgent ‘fish’ to inhabit. He notes that favorable conditions in the water are essential for the fish’s survival. Similarly in Iraq, Al-Qaeda strenuously attempts to muddle the waters by destabilizing the government and encouraging sectarian in-fighting.
However, securing the political support of the population in Iraq is predicated on two pillars of effective leadership—vision and reality. The vision component asks the population to subscribe to the ideological goals of the belligerent parties, and in the case of Iraq, the US-led Coalition and Iraqi government are at a significant advantage. Our vision is a free, democratic, sovereign Iraq abiding by its own balance of Islamic values and universal principles of human rights. The solution proposed by Bin Ladin and Co. is a trans-regional caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia—a vision that is particularly unattractive to members of the Islamic faith who do not subscribe to the extreme Whabbist interpretation. Legitimate concerns held by Iraqi traditionalists about Western values and excesses aside, the choice between some level of self-governance and obedience to Bin Ladin’s theocratic rule is clear. Furthermore, the increasing focus of insurgent attacks on civilian targets has alienated their organization from a crucial base of support.
All the rhetoric in the world though cannot prevent a car-bomb from exploding in a market stall. The most important goal of government forces in Iraq today, and as yet their most glaring failure, is security. The reality of living day-to-day with little assurance of your or your family’s physical security is intensely punishing to any effort on the part of the government to secure political support. Increasingly, the average Iraqi is turning to sectarian militias to guarantee their safety. Like youths in the inner city who turn to gangs for community, support, and safety, the Iraqi population are embracing their tribal identity above their national. Here we see the seeds of civil conflict.
Thus the paramount goal for coalition forces is now three-fold: providing security to the population, ensuring effective and significant reconstruction efforts, and establishing lasting political institutions to guarantee the future of Iraq. These efforts are often outside the military realm, and subsequently should engage all aspects of our government’s civil capacities. They are mutually reinforcing and should be pursued simultaneously but in a manner that respects and encourages Iraqi sovereignty.
