Our Man in Damascus
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Since September 11th, pundits, politicians, and intelligence agents have been demanding more HUMINT, or human intelligence, assets. The failure of the CIA to penetrate al Qaeda prevented the intelligence community from gathering vital HUMINT on bin Laden’s activities. Similarly, America’s reliance on technology (satellites, photographs, etc.) at the cost of developing HUMINT has led to damaging embarrassments like our inability to find stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Our Man in Damascus recounts the classic story of an Israeli spy who epitomizes HUMINT, showing how much potential it holds, how vital it is for security, and how dangerous and difficult it is to maintain.
The Israeli spy agency, Mossad, has been called the most effective intelligence agency in the world. One reason for this, as the late David Atlee Phillips points out in his memoirs, The Night Watch, is because the Mossad only has to operate in one region of the world: the Middle East. The CIA, MI6, and other agencies, on the other hand, are tasked with gathering intelligence and conducting operations throughout the world. Nonetheless, Our Man in Damascus shows just how effective the Mossad’s regional capabilities are. The book’s focus, Elie Cohn, was such an effective agent because both he and the agency were willing to take enormous risks. A “risk-averse” culture in the CIA has, in contrast, been blamed for the agency’s failures in the Global War on Terrorism.
Eli Ben-Hanan retells the story of how Cohn became involved with the Mossad: they show up at his office and ask him to come work for them. After some training, he is sent to Argentina, where there is a substantial expatriate Syrian community. There, he morphs into a Syrian businessman named Kamel Amin Tabet. At a party in Buenos Aires, “Kamel” is introduced to a general named Amin El-Hafez, a Baathist who later becomes president of Syria—and is then toppled in one of Syria’s innumerable coups. Later, Kamel sets up shop in Damascus, where he hosts many parties and builds a reputation as a Syrian patriot, becoming a member of Syrian high society. He transmits a great deal of intelligence to Israel via a radio on his property. After he receives a tour of Syrian border positions courtesy of his new friends within the military’s top brass, Kamel supplies Israel with solid intelligence that allows them to launch retaliatory precision strikes against Syrian positions in 1964
.When Elie Cohn is finally captured (red-handed, unfortunately), he is given a show trial. What is interesting about the trial isn’t so much that it shows how bankrupt much of the Arab judicial system is, but the international outcry that resulted. The author praises France, surprisingly, for doing the most to help Cohn escape execution. Pleas from various countries and institutions prove to be of no avail, however, and Cohn is hung on May 18, 1965. The blow to his wife and family reveal the true cost of espionage.
The Six Day War followed just two years later, revealing how important Cohn’s mission of keeping tabs on the enemy was. Ben-Hanan’s book may be over thirty years old, but it is short, readable, and tremendously relevant for those who seek to understand the Arab mindset and the problems we face as a nation today.
